Economics and Ethics

Six fantastic ethics articles in December 2011 issue of Ratio

Mark D. White

The new issue of Ratio (24/4, December 2011) features six fantastic new articles for heavy hittrers in moral philosophy:

DEONTOLOGICAL MORAL OBLIGATIONS AND NON-WELFARIST AGENT-RELATIVE VALUES, Michael Smith Many claim that a plausible moral theory would have to include a principle of beneficence, a principle telling us to produce goods that are both welfarist and agent-neutral. But when we think carefully about the necessary connection between moral obligations and reasons for action, we see that agents have two reasons for action, and two moral obligations: they must not interfere with any agent's exercise of his rational capacities and they must do what they can to make sure that agents have rational capacities to exercise. According to this distinctively deontological view of morality, though we are obliged to produce goods, the goods in question are non-welfarist and agent-relative. The value of welfare thus turns out to be, at best, instrumental.

RECALCITRANT PLURALISM, Philip Stratton-Lake In this paper I argue that the best form of deontology is one understood in terms of prima facie duties. I outline how these duties are to be understood and show how they offer a plausible and elegant connection between the reason why we ought to do certain acts, the normative reasons we have to do these acts, the reason why moral agents will do them, and the reasons certain people have to resent someone who does not do them. I then argue that this form of deontology makes it harder to unify a pluralistic ethics under a single consequentialist principle in a plausible way, and illustrate this with reference to Rob Shaver's consequentialist arguments.

DEFENDING DOUBLE EFFECT, Ralph Wedgwood This essay defends a version of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) – the doctrine that there is normally a stronger reason against an act that has a bad state of affairs as one of its intended effects than against an otherwise similar act that has that bad state of affairs as an unintended effect. First, a precise account of this version of the DDE is given. Secondly, some suggestions are made about why we should believe the DDE, and about why it is true. Finally, a solution is developed to the so-called ‘closeness problem’ that any version of the DDE must face.

THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSENT, David Owens Worries about the possibility of consent recall a more familiar problem about promising raised by Hume. To see the parallel here we must distinguish the power of consent from the normative significance of choice. I'll argue that we have normative interests, interests in being able to control the rights and obligations of ourselves and those around us, interests distinct from our interest in controlling the non-normative situation. Choice gets its normative significance from our non-normative control interests. By contrast, the possibility of consent depends on a species of normative interest that I'll call a permissive interest, an interest in its being the case that certain acts wrong us unless we declare otherwise. In the final section, I'll show how our permissive interests underwrite the possibility of consent.

ENFORCEMENT RIGHTS AGAINST NON-CULPABLE NON-JUST INTRUSION, Peter Vallentyne I articulate and defend a principle governing enforcement rights in response to a non-culpable non-just rights-intrusion (e.g., wrongful bodily attack by someone who falsely, but with full epistemic justification, believes that he is acting permissibly). The account requires that the use of force reduce the harm from such intrusions and is sensitive to the extent to which the intruder is agent-responsible for imposing intrusion-harm.

DOES MORAL IGNORANCE EXCULPATE?, Elizabeth Harman Non-moral ignorance can exculpate: if Anne spoons cyanide into Bill's coffee, but thinks she is spooning sugar, then Anne may be blameless for poisoning Bill. Gideon Rosen argues that moral ignorance can also exculpate: if one does not believe that one's action is wrong, and one has not mismanaged one's beliefs, then one is blameless for acting wrongly. On his view, many apparently blameworthy actions are blameless. I discuss several objections to Rosen. I then propose an alternative view on which many agents who act wrongly are blameworthy despite believing they are acting morally permissibly, and despite not having mismanaged their moral beliefs.

Utilitarians aren't psychopaths--are they?

Mark D. White

The Economist published a short note recently summarizing the results of a forthcoming paper in Cognition that reports that experiment participants "who indicated greater endorsement of utilitarian solutions had higher scores on measures of Psychopathy, machiavellianism, and life meaninglessness" (from the paper abstract). The experimenters presented subjects with variants of trolley dilemmas--either watch five passengers in a runaway trolley car die, or push one bystander onto the tracks to his death to stop the car--and also asked questions to track their psychological dispositions, finding a strong link between the antisocial tendencies and willingness to kill the bystander to save the trolley passengers.

I'm not going to address the secondhand claims by the authors regarding the "characterization of non-utilitarian moral decisions as errors of judgment," which are inevitably and necessarily made from a utilitarian point-of-view; it's the same problem as with Kaplow and Shavell's Fairness versus Welfare, which dismissed nonwelfarist policymaking as insufficiently welfarist. (I happily note that the paper's authors do criticize these statements in the discussion section of the paper.) But I do want to discuss briefly the results reported in the Cognition study, and explain why I have mixed feelings about it.

First, the trolley problem is too nuanced to make a quick-and-easy judgment regarding deontology and utilitarianism (as the authors acknowledge in the discussion section of the paper, albeit for different reasons). True, simple utilitarianism would demand that, all else aside, you kill the one person to save the five. But a deontological outlook--which is much less well-defined--would not necessarily forbid this, as deontology is not categorically opposed to consequentialist considerations. Rather than simply comparing one to five and making a decision based on the equally valid interests of all the person involved (as a utilitarian would), a deontologist would more likely think about the moral status of the individuals in the case, considering any factors related to responsibility or desert in that particular situation. After ruling out such concerns, a deontologist--even a Kantian--may very well kill the one to save the five (for instance, by judging the duty to save five people to have a "stronger ground of obligation" than the duty not to kill the one, according to Kant's only guidance in such cases of conflicting obligations). The brute utilitarian would regard the decision as the implication of a simple comparison (1<5), while the deontologist would more likely use judgment based on the rights of the persons involved--even if they both come to the same result.

Furthermore, the trolley dilemma also wraps up in it the relative moral status of acts and omissions (itself tied into the deontology vs. utilitarianism debate), as well as issues of identity and virtue (am I the kind of person who can take a life, even to save others?), which themselves have greater implications if taking the one life leads to a change of attitudes toward future moral dilemmas. In other words, the trolley problem should not be used as a moral barometer distinguishing between utilitarianism and deontology. This becomes particularly clear when one considers the different reactions people have to the surgeon problem, in which a surgeon considers harvesting organs from his healthy colleague to save five patients who will die without them--very few endorse this action, even those who would push the bystander in front of the trolley, but it can be difficult to parse out the salient differences in the two situations. (Several variants of these problems, including both the trolley and surgeon dilemmas, were used in the study, apparently with no distinctions made.)

As any regular readers of my work (either on this blog or in print) know, I'm no fan of utilitarianism. But I would never go as far as to say its adherents and practitioners are psychopaths. Utilitarians obviously do care about the well-being of people--my problem is that they are concerned with aggregate well-being that ignores the distinctions between persons (as Rawls said so well) and the inherent dignity and rights of each (as Kant wrote). And that is problematic: regarding persons as nothing but contributors to the collective good implies that each person has no independent, distinct value. And if so, why care about people's interests at all? To my mind, the utilitarian's disregard for the dignity of the individual is self-defeating, since it eliminates any imperative to consider persons' well-being at all (much less to consider it equally with all others').

Of course, the popular press coverage leaves out all of the nuance and qualification present in the academic article, but that is par for the course. The study's authors recognize, of course, that all the "psychopathic" respondents who chose the "utilitarian solution" are not necessarily well-read in Bentham or Mill, nor did they necessarily use utilitarian thinking at all. Nonetheless, the results are suggestive, and if it leads us to look at the differences between utilitarians and deontologists in a different way, it's all good--and right!

Kantian ethics and economics in The Montréal Review

Mark D. White

A synopsis of my book Kantian Ethics and Economics: Autonomy, Dignity, and Character titled "Returning Dignity to Economics" appears in the new online issue of The Montréal Review, alongside articles by Patricia Churchland, Gilles Saint-Paul, and Eric MacGilvray. Let me share the final paragraph, which I think is relevant to much more than merely the topics in my book (and on which I plan to work more soon):

With its roots in classical utilitarianism, mainstream economics treats individuals merely as contributors to social welfare, with little consideration for persons qua individuals. Advances in psychology and neuroscience reinforce this, painting a picture of human beings as flawed machines that need correcting from those who "know better." These are all symptoms of a declining appreciation of autonomy and dignity which serves to diminish the moral status of the individual as well as ignore the benefits that a strong sense of the individual can bring to society as a whole. Integrating Kant's moral insights into economics can help preserve these ideals and ensure that when the good of society is promoted, it is not at the expense of the individuals that comprise it.

Special issue of Metaphilosophy on the work of Christine Korsgaard

Mark D. White

The latest issue of Metaphilosophy (42/4, July 2011) is largely dedicated to the work of Christine Korsgaard, one of my favorite philosophers (and a huge influence on Kantian Ethics and Economics):

SYMPOSIUM ON THE WORK OF CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD INTRODUCTION (pages 349–352) PAUL MCNAMARA

FREEDOM AND THE SOURCE OF VALUE: KORSGAARD AND WOOD ON KANT'S FORMULA OF HUMANITY (pages 353–359) CHRISTOPHER ARROYO

KORSGAARD'S REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM (pages 360–367) DAVID CUMMISKEY

AGENCY AND PRACTICAL IDENTITY: A HEGELIAN RESPONSE TO KORSGAARD (pages 368–375) LYDIA MOLAND

SOME NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF KORSGAARD'S THEORY OF THE INTERSUBJECTIVITY OF REASON (pages 376–380) STEFAN BIRD-POLLAN

NATURAL GOODNESS, RIGHTNESS, AND THE INTERSUBJECTIVITY OF REASON: REPLY TO ARROYO, CUMMISKEY, MOLAND, AND BIRD-POLLAN (pages 381–394) CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD

TRUST: ON THE REAL BUT ALMOST ALWAYS UNNOTICED, EVER-CHANGING FOUNDATION OF ETHICAL LIFE (pages 395–416) J. M. BERNSTEIN

Kantian economics, business leadership, and social responsiblity

Mark D. White

In the latest issue of The European Finance Review (June/July 2011), I have an invited article in which I present the essential points of the Kantian-economic model of choice that I develop more fully in Kantian Ethics and Economics: Autonomy, Dignity, and Character. I also apply the model to business decision-making, and then sketch some preliminary thoughts on the implications of the model--and of Kantian ethics in general--for social responsibility, thoughts which I will elaborate on in January as a participant in the Association for Social Economics program at the ASSA meetings in Chicago (organized by Martha Starr).

Introduction to Kantian Ethics and Economics now available online

Mark D. White

The full introduction to my forthcoming book, Kantian Ethics and Economics: Autonomy, Dignity, and Character, is now available to read at the Stanford University Press website. To whet your appetite, here's the first paragraph:

I love economics, I really do. And I always have, ever since my sixth-grade teacher Mr. Dalton drew a supply-and-demand diagram on the chalkboard. After he explained how it works, I thought he had revealed to me The Answer to Everything. But while I love economics, we definitely have a love/hate relationship. One way in which this book can be seen is as an exploration of that relationship, mediated ultimately by philosophy (and an unlikely choice for a marriage counselor).

Is the Moral Force of Contracts Based on Promise or Consent?

Mark D. White

(To any law-and-economics people reading this: no, the title is not a trick question.)

In 1981, law professor Charles Fried published Contract as Promise, which questioned the utilitarian, efficiency-based defense of contract provided by proponents of law and economics, and offered a deontological, promise-based explanation instead.

In 2011, as part of a 30th anniversary celebration of Fried's book, Randy Barnett has published (forthcoming in Suffolk University Law Review) a paper titled "Contract Is Not Promise; Contract is Consent":

In the 1980s, Charles Fried was right to focus on what was missing from both the “death of contract” and “law and economics” approaches to contract law: the internal morality of contract. But he focused on the wrong morality. Rather than embodying the morality of promise-keeping, the enforcement of contracts can best be explained and justified as a product of the parties’ consent to be legally bound. In this essay, I observe that, in Contract as Promise, Fried himself admits that the “promise principle” cannot explain or justify two features that are at the core of contract law: the objective theory of assent and the content of most “gap fillers” or default rules of contract law. After summarizing how consent to contract accounts for both, I explain that, whereas the morality of promise-keeping is best considered within the realm of ethics — or private morality — legally enforcing the consent of the parties is a requirement of justice — or public morality.

For more on Barnett's views, see his earlier paper, "A Consent Theory of Contract," Columbia Law Review, 86(2), March 1986, pp. 269-321.

New book: Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide, edited by Lara Denis

Mark D. White

Just as the semester ended I recieved a fantastic book in the mail from Cambridge, Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide, edited by Lara Denis (Agnes Scott College), which features a who's who of modern Kant scholarship commenting on Kant's richer treatment of his moral system:

Immanuel Kant's Metaphysics of Morals (1797), containing the Doctrine of Right and Doctrine of Virtue, is his final major work of practical philosophy. Its focus is not rational beings in general but human beings in particular, and it presupposes and deepens Kant's earlier accounts of morality, freedom, and moral psychology. In this volume of newly-commissioned essays, a distinguished team of contributors explores the Metaphysics of Morals in relation to Kant's earlier works, as well as examining themes which emerge from the text itself. Topics include the relation between right and virtue, property, punishment, and moral feeling. Their diversity of questions, perspectives and approaches will provide new insights into the work for scholars in Kant's moral and political theory.

The chapters are as follows:

1. Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: the history and significance of its deferral (Manfred Kuehn)
2. Reason, desire, and the will (Stephen Engstrom)
3. Justice without virtue (Katrin Flikschuh)
4. Kant's innate right as a rational criterion for human rights (Otfried Höffe)
5. Intelligible possession of objects of choice (B. Sharon Byrd)
6. Punishment, retribution, and the coercive enforcement of right (Allen W. Wood)
7. Moral feelings in the Metaphysics of Morals (Paul Guyer)
8. What is the enemy of virtue? (Jeanine Grenberg)
9. Freedom, primacy, and perfect duties to oneself (Lara Denis)
10. Duties to and regarding others (Robert N. Johnson)
11. Duties regarding animals (Patrick Kain)
12. Kant's Tugendlehre as normative ethics (Thomas E. Hill, Jr)

On Artifical Intelligence and Personhood (with thanks to Isaac Asimov)

Mark D. White

Thanks to Larry Solum's Legal Theory Blog, I became aware of F. Patrick Hubbard's new paper "'Do Androids Dream?': Personhood and Intelligent Artifacts," forthcoming in Temple Law Review, which considers the issue of granting the status of personhood to an artificial intelligence:

This Article proposes a test to be used in answering an important question that has never received detailed jurisprudential analysis: What happens if a human artifact like a large computer system requests that it be treated as a person rather than as property? The Article argues that this entity should be granted a legal right to personhood if it has the following capacities: (1) an ability to interact with its environment and to engage in complex thought and communication; (2) a sense of being a self with a concern for achieving its plan for its life; and (3) the ability to live in a community with other persons based on, at least, mutual self interest. In order to develop and defend this test of personhood, the Article sketches the nature and basis of the liberal theory of personhood, reviews the reasons to grant or deny autonomy to an entity that passes the test, and discusses, in terms of existing and potential technology, the categories of artifacts that might be granted the legal right of self ownership under the test. Because of the speculative nature of the Article's topic, it closes with a discussion of the treatment of intelligent artifacts in science fiction.

Skimming through this fascinating paper, I am especially grateful for the extended treatment (pp. 82-88) of Isaac Asimov and his conception of robotic artificial intelligence from his R. Daneel Olivaw novels (as well as his many short stories on robots), a longtime devotion of mine. (Did reading about the Three Laws of Robotics lead to my embrace of Kant later in life? Who knows...)

On What Matters

Jonathan B. Wight

Brad Hooker has an interesting post in The Philosopher’s Magazine on “Ideas of the Century,” focusing on Derek Parfit’s forthcoming book, On What Matters (Oxford University Press, 2011).  Hooker claims that:

The most widely discussed idea in moral philosophy to emerge in the last ten years is Derek Parfit’s conclusion that the best versions of three of the leading moral theories completely coincide in their implications.

 If so, this is partial justification for the view that moral theories are not conflicting, but rather complementary ways of understanding and guiding behavior.  In short, Parfit’s conclusion is that:

Rule-consequentialism is thus argued to be the upshot of the best forms of Kantian and contractualist ethics.

 Is rule consequentialism the version of consequentialism that Adam Smith would endorse?  Where would virtue ethics fit into this mix?  My own view is that in real life rule consequentialism evolves from society’s broad experimentation, not from a philosopher’s pen.  It takes social experiments to winnow out good from bad behaviors and to determine which rules are best.  In short, rule consequentialism is derived inductively rather than deductively. 

At the individual level people follow some rules but emotions give rise to impulses and individual deviations based on moral sentiments that produce new experiments.  Hence, the moral sentiments are essential for the evolution of rule consequentialism. Virtue is needed also to help people develop self control so as to follow the rules.