Trust

David Brooks on deference for incompetent authority in the wake of Ebola fear

Mark D. White

BrooksDavid Brooks' New York Times column this morning, titled "The Quality of Fear," makes a number of claims regarding the source of the panic surrounding the Ebola virus. As usual, he makes useful and insightful points, but he falls a bit flat when he tries to tie this episode into his persistent theme of deference for authority, especially when this episode—as he describes it—reinforces the very skepticism he laments.

His opening point about Ebola points out this dilemma:

In the first place, we’re living in a segmented society. Over the past few decades we’ve seen a pervasive increase in the gaps between different social classes. People are much less likely to marry across social class, or to join a club and befriend people across social class.

That means there are many more people who feel completely alienated from the leadership class of this country, whether it’s the political, cultural or scientific leadership. They don’t know people in authority. They perceive a vast status gap between themselves and people in authority. They may harbor feelings of intellectual inferiority toward people in authority. It becomes easy to wave away the whole lot of them, and that distrust isolates them further. “What loneliness is more lonely than distrust,” George Eliot writes in “Middlemarch.”

So you get the rise of the anti-vaccine parents, who simply distrust the cloud of experts telling them that vaccines are safe for their children. You get the rise of the anti-science folks, who distrust the realm of far-off studies and prefer anecdotes from friends to data about populations. You get more and more people who simply do not believe what the establishment is telling them about the Ebola virus, especially since the establishment doesn’t seem particularly competent anyway.

His point about isolation within social classes is a familiar one (although somewhat redundant, given what social class means), but more troubling is his transition to leadership and authority. Maybe I'm too young, but at what point in our nation's history have people known or felt "one with" those in authority? Aside from the elites in government, business, and the media, I doubt many Americans have ever considered an elected leader or appointed bureaucrat to be "one of us." After all, it is very difficult for people who have no power to connect with people who have power.

(When he writes of the changing perception of authority, perhaps Mr. Brooks is thinking of the increase in distrust in government following Watergate, but this is a separate issue from feeling connected with authority. I would also add that, given what we know how about government operated before Nixon, we would have been wise to be more distrustful back then as well. Trust based on ignorance is hardly a virtue.)

I would have preferred Mr. Brooks to end the piece with his last sentence above: "You get more and more people who simply do not believe what the establishment is telling them about the Ebola virus, especially since the establishment doesn’t seem particularly competent anyway." In my opinion, that's the core issue: incompetence. I'm sure the American people would love to be able to trust their elected leaders to have a handle on crises and a plan to deal with them—and to tell us when a crisis is not in fact a crisis. But we have seen little such competence from government leaders in a long time. Of course, the people behind the scenes, the (mostly) apolitical researchers and scientists and analysts who toil in anonymity for presidents and Congress, are not incompetent. But when their message is filtered through political interests (especially so nakedly and shamelessly) before they get to the people, they become suspect and unreliable. As a result, many people turn to television and the internet to listen to speakers who seem to talk directly to them, with no apparent agenda, even if what they say is hyperbole or simply utter nonsense.

(Brooks touches on the role of the media later in his piece, stressing how they intensify news and cause disproportionate panic. This is true, of course—but this would not have such an impact if people could rely on the true authorities to give them the information they need without having to doubt their motivations almost by reflex.)

Mr. Brooks makes his best point near the end of the article, but again I read it as giving more reason to be skeptical of authority, not less:

The Ebola crisis has aroused its own flavor of fear. It’s not the heart-pounding fear you might feel if you were running away from a bear or some distinct threat. It’s a sour, existential fear. It’s a fear you feel when the whole environment seems hostile, when the things that are supposed to keep you safe, like national borders and national authorities, seem porous and ineffective, when some menace is hard to understand.

In these circumstances, skepticism about authority turns into corrosive cynicism. People seek to build walls, to pull in the circle of trust. They become afraid. Fear, of course, breeds fear. Fear is a fog that alters perception and clouds thought. Fear is, in the novelist Yann Martel’s words, “a wordless darkness.”

Of course people are frightened, and Mr. Brooks is correct to point out that it is an amorphous, "existential" fear. We often make a distinction between risk and uncertainty, in which risk deals with known probabilities (such as the roll of a fair die) while uncertainty deals with unknown probabilities (such as keeping your job). But our current fears reflect another level of uncertainty altogether: not only uncertainty about what is likely to happen, but what can possibly happen at all.

Just think of the things people worry about these days (reasonably or not). Ebola. ISIS. Climate change. Economic inequality. Human trafficking. Civil war. Terrorism. Not as exhaustive list, and obviously skewed by my perspective, but I hope it gets the idea across, which is that these are not risks that can be insured against or "mere" uncertainities that can be planned for. These are perceived threats that, many of them, could not have been imagined before they occurred, have unknown and potentially catastrophic consequences, and have no clear solution. As a result, they all speak to the fragility at the core of human existence—they merit a certain level of fear that is not easily assuaged by political statements from authorities who do not seem to appreciate their gravity or the trepidation they reasonably cause.

As Mr. Brooks wrote, "It’s a fear you feel when the whole environment seems hostile, when the things that are supposed to keep you safe, like national borders and national authorities, seem porous and ineffective, when some menace is hard to understand." In such conditions, I think skepticism about authority is entirely justified, and should not be reversed until authority shows the people it deserves to be trusted. When Mr. Brooks writes that Ebola "exploits the weakness in the fabric of our culture," I think he is spreading the blame too widely. When authority tries to respond to such existential threats but cannot do so outside an explicitly political lens, the message, as valuable as it might be, becomes soiled, and people turn elsewhere for information (and misinformation). But can we blame them?

I fear I will never understand David Brooks' blind appeals to authority and his unshakeable trust in people with power to use that power responsibly. Then again, I was raised to be distrustful of authority (an attitude he would likely attribute to my class upbringing). I have not yet had reason to change my mind, though, and the incompetence he himself identifies this recent episode is hardly going to give me one.


Vernon Smith on Adam Smith at the Social Economics Blog and Forum for Social Economics

Vernon smithMark D. White

The Social Economics Blog (the blog of the Association for Social Economics, of which Jonathan B. Wight and I are currently president and president-elect, respectively) is featuring an article from the Forum for Social Economics by Nobel leaurate Vernon L. Smith on Adam Smith, plus comments from three social economics luminaries (including Jonathan himself). The Forum's publisher, Taylor & Francis, has graciously made the Smith-on-Smith article and comments available of free of charge to encourage open and wide discussion.

The abstract to Smith's paper, "Adam Smith: From Propriety and Sentiments to Property and Wealth," follows:

“Why return to Adam Smith?” Because we learn that he had fresh-for-today insights, derived from a modeling perspective that was never part of economic analysis. Smith wrote two classics: The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759; hereafter Sentiments); and An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776; hereafter Wealth). In Sentiments it is argued that human sociability in close-knit groups is governed by the “propriety and fitness” of conduct based on sympathy. This non-utilitarian model provides new insights into the results of 2-person experimental “trust” and other games that defied the predictions of traditional game theory in the 1980s and 90s, and offers testable new predictions. Moreover, Smith shows how the civil order of “property” grew naturally out of the rules of propriety. Property together with what I call Smith's Discovery Axiom then enabled his break-through in Wealth that defined the liberal intellectual and practical foundation of two centuries of Western economic growth.


"Should We Trust Economists?" Yes and no.

Mark D. White

The worst thing to do when I'm trying to write is have Twitter open. Not only is it distracting (obviously), but it can be positively engrossing. So why do I do it? Because it helps me keep me up-to-date on the state of the world and what smart people are saying about important things.

In the last hour, I've seen two articles that pose questions, which I'll take a shot at answering—please feel free to offer your own answers in the comments below.

Question: "Should We Trust Economists?" asks Noah Smith in The Atlantic.

Answer: Yes, but with serious qualifications.

Smith recounts some familiar and valid criticisms of economics and economists, largely focusing on the limitations of economic models and the lack of experimental data with which to test them. He falters, though, when he dismisses alternative approaches, such as Austrian economics, and in a particularly infantile and insulting way. (I'll leave it to my friends at Coordination Problem to address this if they choose.) Except for that piece, Smith gets a lot right. I'll just mention two reservations that Smith fails to address:

a) Economists have a strong ideological and political bent, which consciously or unconsciously influences their work. This may be true of all scientists and researchers, of course, but the arbitrary and heuristic nature of many assumptions in economic models grants economists a great deal of discretion to insert their values and beliefs in their "scientific" models. So when an economists says "my model recommends stimulus" or "my model recommends austerity," keep in mind that this is not an entirely objective statement—nor can it be.

b) Somewhat related to the first point, economists are much better at saying what will happen than what should happen (and that's true even if you're very doubtful about how well they know the former!). When economists say what should happen—that is, what the government should do or what society should aim for—they're assuming a certain goal which is not an economic concept but an ethical or political one, about which economics training lends little specialized insight. So to the extent we should trust economists, we should trust them to recommend ways to get different places, leaving it to our elected representatives, acting through us, to decide where we want to go. (Or, ask a philosopher!)

So should we trust economists? Yes, if we restrict and temper that trust to focus narrowly on what economists do best—trace out the implications of various actions for key economic variables—and keep in mind the limitations of their prescriptions, based on both the limitations of economic science and the inherent ideology of economic models.

Question: "The question libertarians just can't answer," which is: "If your approach is so great, why hasn’t any country anywhere in the world ever tried it?" This comes from Michael Lind at Salon.

Answer: Many reasons, but the most important one is probably the temptation of power and the wealth it artifically creates, which libertarianism minimize. Even if we want to take a more optimistic approach, then I would cite the presumption of some people to think that a) they know what is better for other people and b) they have the right—nay, the responsibility!—to impose this better way of life on them. This is temptaton of a different sort, born of beneficence but grounded in hubris and disrespect. (I trust Bleeding Heart Libertarians will have more to add to this before long!)


Call for abstracts: Pro-Social Strategies for Public Welfare (The Role of Social Capital and Trust)

Mark D. White

Pro-Social Strategies for Public Welfare: The Role of Social Capital and Trust

Panel/Stream Proposal for IIPPE Fourth Annual Conference in Political Economy, International Institute for Social Studies, The Hague, The Netherlands July 9-11, 2013

Dr. Luca Andriani, Birkbeck College University of London, UK

Dr. Asimina Christoforou, Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece

 

The Fourth International Conference in Political Economy will take place in The Hague (The Netherlands) July 9-11, 2013. The conference theme is “Activism and Alterative Economic Strategies” in light of the on-going economic and political crisis (for details, please consult IIPPE’s new website at http://iippe.org/wp/).

As members of the IIPPE social capital working group, we propose a panel on “Pro-social Strategies for Public Welfare: The Role of Social Capital and Trust”. In the past decades, state and market institutions have failed to deliver redistribution and welfare in both developing and high-income geopolitical contexts, particularly after the global economic crisis broke out. This induced agents to engage in short-term, self-oriented strategies either to consolidate their power or salvage a subsistence level of living, which impedes collective action for social reform and the promotion of long-term public benefits. Nonetheless, and in response to deeper recession, social upheaval and political instability, there are collective efforts for social awareness and mobilisation to confront immediate problems of destitution and to reclaim people’s right to a quality of life.

In this sense, the panel aims to open a constructive discussion on the role of social capital and trust in building pro-social strategies for public welfare. We ask how norms and networks of cooperation, reciprocity and trust could facilitate – or hinder – a wider range of pro-social strategies, which could include, but are not limited to:

  • active social and political participation to deal with the democratic deficit of both the developed and developing world;
  • assessing events of corruption associated not only with the effects and motives of rent-seeking behaviour and tax evasion, but also with the imperspicuous transactions of powerful economic and political groups;
  • advocacy and redistributive functions of non-governmental organisations and voluntary associations that represent disadvantaged groups and fight for their needs and rights;
  • activities of social enterprises and cooperatives that provide alternative ways of production, based on general-interest objectives and innovative forms of democratic participation of
    stakeholders, workers and investors.

We welcome works that derive from various social science disciplines and use different units of analysis (individual, regional, country or cross-country level), methodologies and techniques (theoretical, empirical, qualitative and quantitative).

Abstracts (500 words maximum) should be submitted by the 10th of February 2013 to: Luca Andriani ([email protected]) and/or Asimina Christoforou ([email protected])


Trust—The Magic Elixer

Jonathan B. Wight

Via Brad DeLong comes this quote from Declan Trott:

[W]ealth depends on the division of labour, and the division of labour is limited by the extent of the market. But the extent of the market is not limited only by transport and taxes. It is limited also by trust: by the rules and expectations that allow cooperation for mutual gain between people who do not know each other. And these rules and expectations, particularly the expectations, are hard to build but easy to destroy. In the worst case, not just the extent of the market but its very existence is threatened.

[Image from http://perkettprsuasion.com/2011/04/07/define-trust-not-so-easy-is-it/]

Trott is reviewing Partha Dasgupta, Economics: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2007). The key point of the book is that trust has huge implications for "communities, markets, households and firms." While economists generally assume that transactions involve homogenous products and anonymous traders, the reality is that most transactions involve face-to-face contact and a wide variation of service quality. When services are involved (e.g., finance, medicine, construction, and education) a huge problem of asymmetric information exists. The seller generally knows more than the buyer about how the house was constructed. That is why trust is so essential.

A theme developed on this blog is that trust does not arise simply from enlightened self-interest. If that were the case, people would be trustworthy only if there were a reasonable chance of being caught and punished. While such accountability is crucial, it is not the only part of the story. There is a deeper kind of trust that arises when people adopt Kantian duty as their mindset, or when people uphold honesty because of that virtue for virtue's sake.

The problem I have with neoclassical accounts of markets is that they do not accurately convey important elements of the philosophical and psychological dimensions of trust-creation.